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It is now more than quarter of a century since the demise of socialist economies in Europe was put in motion by the
fall of the Berlin Wall. In many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, the transition from socialist planning to market
capitalism is all but forgotten; for example in the bustling modern economies of the Czech Republic, Poland or the
three Baltic states. The process of integration into the European, and the broader world economy, has been
accelerated for many of the central European countries by early membership of the European Union.  A key
mechanism for this integration is trade and especially foreign direct investment.
However, the integration process has been much slower and less effective in South Eastern Europe (SEE),
especially in the Balkans where economic growth, low employment and closer economic relationships with their
richer Northern and Western neighbours remains elusive. We have explored the role of foreign direct investment in
this unsatisfactory, and potentially politically destabilising, performance.
We first explore how much FDI there has actually been to South Eastern Europe (SEE); namely to Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia. In fact, foreign investors arrived
later to most of SEE than to the other transition economies and the inflow of FDI to this region in the 1990s was low
in comparison, probably because of the political risk and high economic instability in the region. Over the 1989-2000
period, the inward FDI stock in the seven SEE countries amounted to around US$ 15.3 billion or 9.4 percent of total
inward FDI stock in all 27 transition countries.
Perhaps as a consequence of the improving political and economic conditions, there was a marked increase in FDI
to the whole SEE region after 2000. Even so, by 2010 the eight SEE countries had received only around a third of
the volume of FDI that had gone to the eight Central European countries and the Baltics. The share of the eight SEE
countries in total inward FDI stock in the transition region increased from 9.4 per cent in 2000 to 14.7 per cent in
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2010 (of which 5.8 per cent in the Western Balkans and another 8.9 per cent in EU members, Bulgaria and
Romania).
In terms of sectors, the service sector accounted for the largest part of inward FDI stock in all seven SEE countries,
on average 62 per cent of total in the SEE region, but with substantial variations among countries. The service
sector represented around 50 per cent of inward FDI stock in Macedonia and Romania, close to 60 per cent in
Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 68 per cent in Bulgaria and as much as 73 per cent in both Croatia and
Serbia. Banking, telecommunications, real estate and wholesale and retail trade have been among the most
favoured sectors of foreign investors in the region. Regarding manufacturing, there are even greater differences
across countries. The only three countries that have attracted a considerable amount of FDI in manufacturing are
Bosnia and Herzegovina (35 per cent of total), Macedonia (31 per cent) and Romania (32 per cent).
Using a gravity model of FDI to investigate the factors driving FDI into the Balkans, it is found that FDI from around
the world into the transition economies is explained by the GDPs of the home and host economies and the
geographic distance between them. As expected, the estimation describes very well the FDI inflow process; FDI is
positively and significantly related to the GDP of the host and source economy, and negatively related to their
geographic distance. However, there is always a negative Western Balkans effect in the estimates. Thus, we find
that there remains an unexplained negative factor influencing FDI into the Western Balkans; the coefficient on the
Balkans dummy variable is negative and significant. This result goes through even when a variety of additional
control variables for labour costs, EU membership and institutional quality are taken into account.
Figure 1. Inward FDI stock by transition regions, 2010 (shares, in percent)
Therefore our analysis shows that the levels of FDI to the Western Balkan economies can be explained by three
categories of factors.
The first is the size of the domestic economies; the Western Balkan economies are for the most part rather
small and the GDP of the host economy has a significant positive effect on FDI. The fragmentation of the
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region, which has been exacerbated by events since the early 1990s, is clearly a factor militating against FDI.
Secondly, their distance from the investing economies of Western Europe, and their remoteness from the EU
and other major trading blocs, summarized in our framework by the distance variable, which is always
negative and significant in our equations. There are no simple policy solutions to geographic issues but
distance can be offset by greater trade, regulatory and institutional integration.
The third category of factors relates to institutional quality, though this is harder to interpret because of
collinearity between the various measures. Taken together, the results suggest that a variety of institutional
factors are the third significant determinant of FDI into transition economies; in general there is more FDI into
countries where institutions are more market supporting. Institutional quality is closely related to EU
membership – it is the countries which score more highly in terms of these indicators of institutional quality
which are members of the EU, though it is not clear in which direction the causality runs. The process of
joining the EU leads countries to improve their institutional quality. On the other hand, the EU tends to admit
as members countries which are further advanced in terms of developing their institutions. Thus we find that
announcement of EU membership also leads to higher levels of FDI, but it is not clear whether this effect is
independent from the institutional quality effect.
However, even taking all these factors into account, our regressions confirm the view that there is a negative
‘Western Balkans’ effect on FDI. Once all the institutional variables are taken into account, the dummy variable for
the Western Balkans is still statistically significant, independently of whether the EU dummy is included or not. Thus
being in the Western Balkans exercises an independent negative effect on FDI in an extended gravity equation. This
seems to indicate that the unfortunate recent political history of the region, with conflicts, fragmentation and slow
recovery of pre-transition GDP, have exercised a long lasting and independent effect on their prospects for receipt of
FDI. The political risk, deriving from various unsettled political issues in the region, still seems to exercise a negative
effect on FDI.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on the authors’ paper FDI into transition economies: Are the Balkans different?
(2014), The Economics of Transition, Vol. 22 (2), pp. 281-312.
The post gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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